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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MINIMUM STREAMFLOWSFEDERAL POWER TO SECURE

Through operation of the doctrine of prior appropriation, the
scarce and precious waters of the West have been applied to ever
higher "beneficial" uses. However, antedating these economic uses
by millennia, the forest streams providing that water have supported
complex and fragile ecosystems involving both aquatic and forest
wildlife, and in their serene and natural beauty have been sources of
inspiration and peace for all who have gazed upon them. Recently,
apparently striving for the Olympic goal of higher, faster, and
further, developers and industries have been acquiring appropriative
water rights in the headwaters of those streams. The result has been a
serious diminution of flow in the streams with consequent damage to
the wildlife dependent on them. In order to check or reverse this
trend the federal government has been asserting prior rights to
adequate instream flows to protect the wildlife. This Comment will
examine two alternatives by which those rights have been and possibly may be asserted.
To date there has been surprisingly little effective federal activity
in this area. The Wild and Scenic River Act of 19681 was apparently
Congress' first attempt to legislate minimum streamflows. While the
Act has much to commend it, its scope is so limited that it must be
considered little more than tokenism. Similarly, the Water Bank Act
of 19702 has fine words in its preamble, but does nothing to assure
adequate instream flows. There has, however, been some attempt to
protect the mountain streams running through national forests by
claiming federal reservation rights to enough water to satisfy all the
purposes for which the reservation was originally set aside. 3 Among
the claimed purposes are recreational and aesthetic uses and wildlife
protection.4 At this time no case has been reported recognizing such
purposes, though decisions in several cases which address this issue
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1271, et seq. (1970).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq. (1970).
3. There are currently several cases pending in both New Mexico and Colorado, e.g. State
of New Mexico ex rel. S. E. Reynolds v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, Civil No. 9780 (D.
N.M., filed Nov. 2, 1972), Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, Civil No. 6326 (6th
N.M.J.D. Ct., filed Mar. 21, 1966).
4. See, e.g. Complaint for Intervening Plaintiff United States, State of New Mexico. ex
rel. S. E. Reynolds v. Molybdenum Corp. of America (D. N.M. filed Nov. 2, 1972).
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pending in Colorado and New Mexico will probably be made within
the reasonably near future.
FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS
5 there can no longer be any serious
After Arizona v. California
doubt as to the existence of a federal right to the use of that water
necessary to fulfill the purposes for which federal public domain
lands were reserved from entry. The basic principle is that the United
States as sovereign and "original" owner of most of the lands in the
West also is the owner of all water and water rights not specifically

given up.6 When the United States, by Congressional enactment or

by Presidential proclamation, reserved particular lands for particular
purposes, it was impliedly reserving to itself, that is, holding on to
what it already possessed fully, all rights to use water in any quantity
necessary to the fulfillment of the purposes of the reservation or
enclave. 7 When Congress, by the Desert Land Act of 18778 and its
precursor acts of 1866' and 1870,' 0 allowed then unappropriated
public waters to be subject to appropriation, it was merely permitting the states to regulate the further appropriation of waters on
public lands according to state law.' ' It was not making a grant of
water or water rights to the states. Thus, even though the United
States was allowing the states to regulate future appropriations and
the establishment of private water rights enforceable against everyone, including the United States, it was still retaining original ownership of the right to use the unappropriated waters on and under the
public lands.' 2 And when the United States set aside land and withdrew the right of entry, it was necessarily withholding enough of the
then unappropriated appurtenant waters to accomplish the purposes
of the reservation.' 3
In the leading case of Winters v. United States' the controlling
fact was not the existence of a treaty with an Indian tribe or lands
reserved by the United States for the tribe, but rather the continuing
ownership by the United States of the right to control unappropri5. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
6. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). See
generally Warner, Federal Reserved Water Rights and Their Relationship to Appropriative
Rights in the Western States, 15 Rocky Mt. Mineral L. Inst. 399 (1969).
7. United Statesv. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970), 19 Stat. 377.
9. 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1970), 14 Stat. 251.
10. 30 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), 16 Stat. 217.
11. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
12. Warner, supra note 6, at 407.
13. Id.

14. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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ated water in the Milk River.' s The United States could not have
"reserved" something which it did not already possess, and the
Supreme Court did not speak of appropriation or acquisition of
rights by the federal government. It spoke of holding back what was
already owned. 1 6 Similarly, in United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation
Co.

'

the Court said:

[I] n the absense of specific authority from Congress a State cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner

of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters;
so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the
government property.' 8
Following a series of cases' 9 further clarifying the "Winters doctrine" as applied to Indian reservations, the Supreme Court in
Arizona v. California2 extended the doctrine to support water rights
for a national recreational area, wildlife refuges, and a national
forest. 2 ' This was done on the dual grounds of continuing original
ownership of the rights and the combination of the Commerce
Clause and Article IV, § 3 of the United States Constitution granting
the power to the general government to regulate navigable waters and
government lands.2 2 Since Arizona v. Californiathere has been little
reported litigation on the use of the doctrine in the national
forests, 2 3 and with the exception of several pending cases, 2 4 none
dealing with maintaining minimum flow for the preservation of
esthetic values and ecological protection.
That there is a need for some kind of federal reservation of water
rights is no longer seriously questioned. Without some such power,
admittedly valid federal uses of water might otherwise not be recognized because they would be inconsistent with the more traditional
concepts of prior appropriation law at the state level. While a considerable body of authority now places recreation and fishing purposes as
15. Warner, supra note 6, at 404.

16. Id.
17. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
18. Id. at 703.
19. See, e.g. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921); United States ex rel. Ray
v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho, 1928); United States v. Mclntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.
1939).
20. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
21. Id. at 601.
22. Id. at 597-598.
23. See, e.g., Glenn v. United States, Civil No. C-153-61 (D. Utah, 1963);In re Chiliwist
Creek, Okanogan County Cause No. 16323 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1967); see generally Note,
Water in the Woods: The Reserved-Rights Doctrine and National Forest Lands, 20 Stan. L.

Rev. 1187 (1968).
24. See supra note 3.
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within the limits of the concept of beneficial use, 2 s other less tangible values such as preservation of wilderness and areas of natural
beauty or of historic and scientific interest would have a more
difficult time competing with such development-oriented values as
storage for irrigation and flood control, navigation, hydroelectric
power, slackwater recreation and low flow augmentation for other
downstream development purposes. Because these relatively uncompetitive purposes are of national interest, they need national protection, and some form of reservation doctrine seems particularly well
suited for the task.
In the area of purpose of the water reservation the federal government has encountered its stiffest opposition. The Organic Administration Act of 189726 says that:

No national forest shall be established except to improve and protect
the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows ....

2?

The United States has argued2 8 that this provision recognizes as a
valid purpose the maintenance of minimum streamflows within
national forests for whatever purposes, including esthetic or wildlife
preservation. Its position is further supported by the Multiple UseSustained Yield Act of 1960 which provided that:
• . . National Forests are established and shall be administered for

outdoor recreation,
range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
30
purposes.
In opposition 3 1 it is contended that the language of the Organic
Administration Act means only to assure "favorable conditions of
water flows" below the forests and not within them. The legislative
history of the Act, 3 2 tends to support this position. Economic interests motivated establishment of the national forests 3 ' even
though prior to the Organic Administration Act other essentially
25. See, e.g., State ex reL State Game Comm'n. v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207,
182 P.2d 421 (1945); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(4) (1973).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970).
27. Id.
28. Objections to Proposed Findings of Intervenor United States, Mimbres Valley Irriga-

tion Co. v. Salopek, Civil No. 6326 (6th N.M. J.D. Ct., filed Mar. 21, 1966).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970).
30. Id.
31. Memorandum Brief of Intervening Plaintiff State of New Mexico at 9, Mimbres
Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, Civil No. 6326 (6th N.M. J.D. Ct., filed Mar. 21, 1966).
32. See, e.g., 30 Cong. Rec. 917, 966, 1006-07, 1399; Report of the Committee upon
the Inauguration of the Forest Policy, S. Doc. No. 105, 55th Cong., 1st Sess. (1897), in New
Mexico's Memorandum Brief at 11-14, supra note 31.
33. Id.
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noneconomic interests were asserted as secondary purposes.3" As
has been suggested, perhaps only those purposes which were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the establishment of the reservation
should be entitled to consideration for reservation water rights.3
Thus, where an Indian reservation was set aside, it takes no great
imagination to consider irrigation to be a part of the overall purpose to
take care of the Indians. But to consider a free-flowing stream as part of
the overall purpose of forest management is a different proposition
entirely and requires a different degree of foreseeability.
The real problems with the reservation doctrine and its application
are not the deprivation of water to state appropriators (or to federal
projects either) but 1) who is going to pay for the water and 32)
injection of an element of uncertainty into the water market. 6
Since the keystone of the prior appropriation scheme is judicial
enforcement of legitimate expectations, any reduction of reliance
adversely affects the marketability of water rights and hinders the
reallocation of water to "higher economic purposes."" '

'

Quantifica-

tion of the claimed federal reserved rights would solve the problem
of uncertainty and would seem not to be too onerous a burden on
the government in view of developing hydrologic technology and
increased ability accurately to project future needs. This seems particularly so in any claim for minimum instream flows. With the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Eagle County District
Court 3 8 that the McCarran amendment allows all federal water
rights, both appropriative and reserved, to be adjudicated in general
river system adjudication suits, it seems reasonable to expect that
more federal claims for reserved rights to minimum streamflows
through national forests will be asserted, and if allowed, quantified.
FEDERAL NAVIGATION POWER

From the standpoint of environmental protection, another and
potentially more attractive method is available to the federal government to maintain minimum streamflows. This method calls for application of the federal navigational power and servitude.3"
The navigation power allows virtually any governmental action
34. B. E. Fernow, Report of the Chief of the Division of Forestry (1891), cited in United
States' Objections to Proposed Findings, supra note 28.
35. Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 707,

736 (1970).
36. Note, supra note 23.
37. Id.

38. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
39. See generally Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and
the Rule of No Compensation, 3 Nat. Res. J. 1 (1963).
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which even tends incidentally to maintain or improve the navigable
capacity of the nation's waterways.4 0 Originally, the power was
exercised as part of the federal commerce power to clear obstructions to navigation, improve channels, and construct and maintain
harbors. 4 The navigation power stems from the commerce clause,4 2
and until the reach of the commerce clause itself was extended beginning in the 1930s it was assumed that protection and maintenance of
navigation constituted not only the basis but also the measure and
limit of the power.4"
The line of cases extending the scope of the navigation power
began with Arizona v. California4" in 193 1. In that case it was held:
.
. that purposes other than navigation will also be served could
not invalidate the exercise of the authority conferred, even if those
other purposes would not alone have justified an exercise of Congressional power.4 s

In 1940, in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 4 6 the
Supreme Court said:
In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power
of the United States over its waters is limited to control for navigation. . . . In truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce on its waters. . . . That authority is as broad as
the needs of commerce. 4
Flood control, 4 8 land reclamation, 49 and hydroelectric power generation' 0 soon came within the purview of the navigation power,
and by 1956 the Supreme Court allowed exercise of the power where

the benefit to navigation was scarcely more than marginally incidental.' 1
While the constitutional power has been greatly expanded, the
action must still have some relationship to the navigable waters of

the United States.' 2 The concept of navigability originally encom40. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941).
41. Comment, Navigational Servitude as a Method of Ecological Protection,75 Dick. L.
Rev. 256, 257 (1971).
42. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963).
43. Morreale, supra note 39, at 9.

44. 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
45. Id. at 456.
46. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
47. Id. at 426.
48. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
49. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
50. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n., 328 U.S. 152
(1946).
51. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
52. Id.
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passed only those waterways which were navigable in fact, that is
".. . used, or.

.

.susceptible of being used, in their ordinary con-

dition, as highways of commerce. '"" 3 That was a convenient starting
point, but the law today allows the application of the navigation
power to nonnavigable stretches of navigable streams," streams
which once were navigable but no longer are,' s streams which could
become navigable with reasonable improvements, s 6 and even to
nonnavigable streams which are tributary to or affect navigable
5
streams. 7
In order for the United States to exercise its power over nonnavigable streams, it is necessary that Congress expressly declare the
exercise to be for a navigational purpose.5 8 However, as pointed out
above, the navigational purpose need be only one purpose of the
project, and only an incidental purpose at that. Furthermore, a Congressional declaration that the federal action will benefit navigation
and that the means chosen are reasonable are conclusive." 9 Although
the courts undoubtedly have the power to review these Congressional
determinations for arbitrariness, they have never held any such
declaration to be either unreasonable or arbitrary. 6 0
The navigation power has only just begun to be used for environmental protection purposes. In two state cases involving the filling of
lake shores, the courts split, one holding that the navigation servitude
was an appropriate tool to block the operations (which would in fact
have created obstructions to navigation along the former shore
line) 6 1 and the other holding that the rule of no compensation was
too harsh and that therefore the servitude should not be used.6 2 In
1970 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that conservation was a
valid commerce purpose and that the general federal navigation
power may be invoked to prevent a filling operation on submerged
land on a tributary to navigable estuarine waters. 6 ' After adopting
the findings of the Secretary of the Army that the dredging and
53. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
54. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation, 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
55. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
56. See Morreale, supra note 39, at 3-8.
57. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525 (1941), and
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960).
58. Morreale, supra note 39, at 11-12.
59. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
60. Morreale, supra note 39, at 13.
61. Wilborn v. Gallagher, 77 Wash.2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied 400 U.S.
878 (1970).
62. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
63. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
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filling would have a harmful effect on the fish and wildlife resources,6" the court said:
...the nation knows, if the Courts do not, that the destruction of
fish and wildlife in our estuarine waters does have a substantial,
and
65
in some areas a devastating effect on interstate commerce.
In 1974 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the use of the
federal navigation power to be an appropriate method for controlling
discharges of pollutants into both navigable waters and nonnavigable
tributaries to navigable waters.6 6 The court found that water pollution poses a health threat, endangers national agriculture, and diminishes enjoyment of rivers and lakes for fishing, boating, and swimming.6I The court considered these interests to be proper subjects
for Congressional attention because of their impact on interstate
commerce. 6 8 In addition, water pollution was found to be a direct
threat to navigation itself.6
Thus, the doctrine of navigational servitude entitles the federal
government to control the quality of effluent from riparian owners
whose land drains into nonnavigable streams in pursuance of the
federal interest in preserving the navigability and the quality of the
navigable waters7 0of the commerce-carrying rivers into which these
tributaries flow.
At this point it seems fair to induce the following proposition:
The navigation power may be used to prevent the destruction of fish
and other aquatic wildlife resources in or the impairment of recreational uses of nonnavigable waters if the navigable capacity of the
mainstream is also thereby benefited, however incidentally, and if
Congress has expressly declared that the benefit to navigation is
among the purposes of the proposed federal action.
APPLICABILITY OF THE NAVIGATION POWER
TO THE MINIMUM STREAMFLOW PROBLEM
It is patently obvious that the drying up of forest streams by
upstream appropriators would endanger both the natural habitat of
significant fish and wildlife resources and the public recreational use
and enjoyment of those streams. Likewise, no great insight is re64. Id. at 201.
65. Id. at 203.
66. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
67. Id. at 1325.
68. Id.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 1328.
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quired to say that a pattern of such drying up of forest streams
would adversely affect the navigable capacity (which is not to say
actual navigational use) of the mainstreams into which the forest
streams flow. If the proposition of law stated above is accurate, then
it seems safe to deduce that use of the navigation power is an appropriate method for requiring maintenance of some minimum level of
streamflow if Congress should be willing to so exercise it.
The most likely stumbling block to Congress' exercise of the
navigation power to guarantee minimum streamflows is the rule of
"no compensation."'" The rule is based on the theory that there can
be no superior private ownership rights to the flow of navigable
waters and that, since the sovereign already owns the flow (subject
only to private licenses or usufructuaries), no Fifth Amendment
taking can occur.7 2 The growth of the no compensation rule has
largely paralleled the growth of the navigation power itself so that
today it has been extended to the flow of nonnavigable tributaries of
navigable streams. 7 a However, the political reality of the situation is
that Congress is unlikely to apply the no compensation rule, and for
good reason. First, there is no compelling logic requiring water highways to be treated any differently from air or land highways, and,
second, it seems fair that individual appropriators should not bear
the full economic burden of benefits which will accrue to all the
people. 7 4 Since it is both possible and realistically feasible to invoke
the navigation power and pay for any impairment to private water
rights, Congress should move to enact appropriate legislation now
while costs are lowest and potential benefits greatest.
The disadvantage associated with the reservation water rights, i.e.,
the adverse effect of economic reliance on appropriative rights, can
be largely mitigated under the navigation power approach by Congress' agreement to pay for any impairment to existing water rights.
In addition, the navigation power can reach virtually all streams and
not just those within established federal reservations.
CONCLUSION
It seems clear that the federal government has both the means and,
a growing majority of Americans would no doubt argue, the duty to
secure to "ourselves and our posterity" forest streams which will
support delicate ecologic systems and provide opportunities for the
rejuvenation of our future-shocked souls.
DAVID A. GRADY
71.
72.
73.
74.

See generally, Morreale, supra note 39.
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913).
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
Morreale, supra note 39, at 31.

